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Chapter    11 
Alternative views on EU citizenship 
Sandra Mantu 
11.1. Introduction 
The direction in which EU citizenship is heading has been a matter of debate for 
some time, although there is little agreement as to whether the interpretation 
given to the rights of mobile EU citizens is too restrictive, or too generous. 2016, 
as the year in which a majority of the British people voted to leave the European 
Union (EU) and, consequently, renounce their status as EU citizens, may turn out 
to play an important role in shaping the future of EU citizenship. In this context, 
the extent to which EU citizenship will live up to the expectations derived from 
its characterization by the EU Court of Justice as destined to become the 
fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States seems to be an open 
question. Brexit is a reminder that at least a sufficient number of British citizens 
failed to see the benefits associated with EU citizenship. If the political campaign 
preceding the vote on leaving the EU is anything to go by, the main legal right 
associated with EU citizenship, namely the right to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, proved to be a divisive matter in assessing the 
benefits of UK’s EU membership.  
 
Against this background, the aim of this contribution is to flag out a series of 
aspects concerning EU citizenship that could serve as a basis for reflection on its 
potential to act as a fundamental status. My starting point is the increasing 
politicization of the right to free movement as evidenced by debates on the 
(negative) effects of free movement that are taking place in a number of Member 
States.1 The decision of the British people to leave the EU was partly fuelled by 
discontent towards free movement and accompanied by the message that the 
mobility of certain EU citizens is undesirable and should be limited. In other 
Member States, such as Germany, while support for free movement remains 
politically the main message, 'poverty migration' and 'welfare tourism' are 
                                                             
1  Mantu S. & P. Minderhoud (2016), ‘Exploring the limits of social solidarity: welfare tourism 
and EU citizenship’, UNIO-EU Law Journal 2, p.4-19. 
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branded as problematic cases of EU mobility.2 Who exactly is targeted by such 
notions is not always clear, since from a legal perspective such discourses seem to 
involve a combination and conflation of mobile poor EU citizens, economically 
inactive EU citizens, EU citizens who engage in poorly paid work, citizens from 
poorer Member States etc.  I want to suggest a number of alternative perspectives 
on EU citizenship that may inform discussions on how EU citizenship can 
achieve its ‘radical’ and ‘transformative potential’.3 While I agree that it is 
necessary to problematize EU citizenship, its meaning and potential, I want to 
suggest that this can be done without recurring to racialized discourses such as 
those relying on 'poverty migration', which castigate some EU citizens as 
unworthy of mobility and EU citizenship. While these discourses proved popular 
with voters, as shown by Brexit, they deflect our attention from questioning to 
what extent and how EU citizenship can achieve its potential and function as a 
fundamental status, with all the consequences and expectations attached to such 
a label.  
 
The discussion below builds upon the idea that EU citizenship can be explored as 
a ‘momentum concept’4 that must be continuously reworked in a way that 
realizes more and more of its egalitarian and anti-hierarchical potential. As Lister 
points out, this means engaging with citizenship’s exclusionary-inclusionary 
nexus to deal with marginalized groups’ calls for social justice.5 The analytical 
lenses through which EU citizenship and mobility are examined in this chapter 
depart from the traditional frames of constitutionalism or European integration 
and offer a critique of EU citizenship that builds on: the figure of the ‘Other’; the 
notion of biopolitics, and questions of difference and embodiment.  
 
These alternative ways of thinking about EU citizenship and its relevance are an 
attempt to break out of the mould of EU law as the main disciplinary frame 
through which EU citizenship is approached and naturalized as producing 
knowledge on and of EU citizens' mobility.  
                                                             
2 K. Nowrot & B. Struckmeyer-Öner (2014), ‘Sozialtourismus in Europa?: Unions-und sozial-
rechtliche Anmerkungen zu einer aktuellen Debatte’, Policy Papers on Transnational Economic 
Law 40, Transnational Economic Law Research Centre; D. Bräuninger (2015), ‘Debate on free 
movement - Does the EU need new rules on social security coordination?’, Deutsche Bank 
Research Briefing.  
3  D. Kostakopoulou (2014), European Union citizenship rights and duties: civil, political and 
social, in: E. Isin & P. Nyers (eds) Routledge handbook of global citizenship studies, Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, pp. 487-488. 
4  John Hoffmann quoted in R. Lister (2007), ‘Inclusive Citizenship: Realizing the Potential’, 
Citizenship Studies 11:1, p.49.  
5  Lister (2007) p. 49. 
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11.2. To whom does EU citizenship belong? Who is the 'Other' of EU 
citizenship?  
According to Mezzadra, the very discourse of citizenship is historically and 
theoretically based upon the distinction between an inside and an outside, which 
is not easily escaped while remaining within the discourse of citizenship itself.6 
Moreover, national citizenship is usually understood to be a bounded category, 
closely associated with the development of the nation-state as the main political 
unit and container of people within delimited territorial units. If EU citizenship is 
built upon the image of national citizenship, as Article 20 TFEU seems to 
suggest7, one can ask to what extent it implies a similar closure and boundary 
making exercise in determining its reach and the people it embraces. Through 
the lens of citizenship as an exercise into 'othering', one can start to articulate 
whether EU citizenship, similar to national citizenship, requires the existence of 
an 'Other' in opposition to which it is defined. Who is caught by the personal 
scope of EU citizenship has been a vexing issue since the introduction of EU 
citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty.8 This issue has been raised in relation to the 
exclusion of third-country nationals (TCNs) from the personal scope of EU 
citizenship, which was seen as confirmation of EU citizenship's exclusionary 
nature (similar to the exclusionary nature of national citizenship). Groenendijk 
feared that this distinction between 'us' (EU citizens) and 'them' (TCNs) would 
have a detrimental effect upon the legal position of the latter group, although he 
later acknowledged that the Court's jurisprudence did much to alleviate this sort 
of concerns by interpreting the secondary EU legislation dealing with TCNs in a 
positive manner and by trying to approximate their rights to those of EU 
citizens.9 In his contribution to this volume, he again voices concerns about the 
                                                             
6  S. Mezzadra (2011), ‘The gaze of autonomy - Capitalism, migration and social struggles’, in: V. 
Squire (ed), The contested politics of mobility. Borderzones and irregularity, Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, p.24. 
7  Article 20(1) TFEU states 'Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union 
shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.' 
8 A. Føllesdal (2000), ‘Third country nationals as European citizens: the case defended’, The 
Sociological Review 48:1, p.104-122; R. Hansen (1998), ‘A European citizenship or a Europe of 
citizens? Third country nationals in the EU’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24:4, p.751-
768.  
9  K. Groenendijk (2009), ‘Forty Years of Free Movement of Workers: Has it Been a Success and 
Why?’, in: P. Minderhoud & N. Trimikliniotis (eds), Rethinking the free movement of workers: 
the European challenges ahead, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, p.11-25; K. Groenendijk 
(2006), ‘Citizens and Third Country Nationals: Differential treatment or Discrimination?’, in: 
J.Y Carlier & E. Guild (eds), The future of free movement of persons in the EU, Brussels: Bruylant, 
p.79-101. 
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impact that Brexit will have on the rights of TCNs, showing that the issue is still 
salient and unresolved. A different set of criticisms relating to EU citizenship's 
reach concerns the position of those EU citizens who never move. Besides having 
the nationality of one of the Member States, the other condition for being able to 
exercise what the Treaty labels EU citizenship rights, is to physically move to 
another EU Member State.10 Although the Court's jurisprudence is making a 
series of inroads into this condition in cases such as Zambrano11 or Rendón 
Marín,12 its implications remain limited to exceptional situations that involve 
minor EU citizens whose genuine enjoyment of the substance of their rights as 
EU citizens would be violated should they not come within the protective scope 
of EU law.  
 
From a legal perspective, Articles 20-25 TFEU detail to whom EU citizenship 
belongs and what this citizenship entails. As such, every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State is a citizen of the Union and in this capacity she 
has a series of rights: the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, electoral rights, the right to diplomatic protection while outside 
of the EU, the right to petition the European Parliament and the Ombudsman, 
the right to petition EU institutions, and the right to access EU documents. In 
addition, Article 18 TFEU establishes a right to non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. Despite this panoply of rights, EU citizenship remains associated 
primarily with the right to move and reside freely in another Member State. 
Opinion polls confirm that free movement is the most visible achievement of EU 
citizenship and a right most cherished by EU citizens themselves.13 Without 
repeating the history of EU citizenship and its coming into being upon the 
already existing provisions concerning the free movement of workers, it is 
nevertheless important to stress that the transformation of EU citizenship into a 
meaningful legal status is intrinsically connected with the incorporation of 
economically inactive citizens into the legal framework of EU free movement of 
persons. This process was driven by the case law of the Court of Justice that relied 
on the joint reading of the provisions on EU citizenship and the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality in order to bring economically inactive 
citizens within the scope of application of the Treaty. Tomkin describes EU 
                                                             
10  E. Guild (2014) Migration, security and European citizenship, in: E. Isin & P. Nyers (eds) 
Routledge handbook of global citizenship studies, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, p. 421. 
11  CJEU 8 March 2011, C-34/09, Zambrano, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
12   CJEU 13 September 2016, C-165/14, Rendón Marín, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675. 
13  Flash Eurobarometer 43, 2016; Standard Eurobarometer 83, 2015. 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON EU CITIZENSHIP 225 
225 
 
citizenship as the ‘dedicated legal home’ for non-economically active EU citizens.14 
In his view, this explains why after its introduction, the Court stopped squeezing 
certain categories of economically inactive citizens into the scope of Article 45 
TFEU that deals with EU workers and ‘then perform conceptual gymnastics in 
order to distinguish their rights from the rights of economically active workers’.15  
 
A combined reading of Articles 20, 21 and of the Court’s citizenship case law, 
suggests that in theory, every national of a Member State is a EU citizen who has 
a subjective and enforceable right to move. However, if we start deconstructing 
the idea that EU citizenship is a universal status or as the Court of Justice states 
‘the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States when exercising free 
movement rights’,16 it becomes clear that not all EU citizens enjoy free movements 
rights in the same way. Conditions and restrictions can be placed through 
secondary legislation, such as those enacted through Directive 200/38, also 
known as the Citizens’ Directive. Different legal categories of citizens enjoy 
different rights when they want to reside in a host Member State for longer than 3 
months, while the performance of an economic activity remains the main axis of 
differentiation between the rights of mobile EU citizens. This differential 
treatment is meant to end once a mobile EU citizen has resided legally in a host 
state for 5 continuous years, after which she is entitled to acquire permanent 
residence. However, clocking the 5 years of continuous residence is going to be 
more difficult for some EU citizens: economically inactive citizens who find 
themselves temporarily without resources or become unemployed may find it 
difficult to meet the conditions set by the Directive.  
 
It can be argued that the conditional nature of the right to reside for longer than 3 
months means that only those nationals who meet the criteria of self-sufficiency 
or performance of an economic activity will be able to enjoy their EU citizenship 
rights, and that EU mobility has a set of inbuilt filtering mechanisms. Yet, the 
mobility of some categories of EU citizens is described as problematic and in 
need of control. Calls to restrict the free movement of EU citizens focus on 
citizens from poor EU states exercising free movement rights, EU citizens who 
circumvent restrictive family reunification rules in their own state of nationality 
by exercising free movement rights as EU citizens, and criminal EU citizens, 
                                                             
14  J. Tomkin (2009), ‘The Worker, the Citizen, their Families and the Court of Justice: Tales of 
Free Movement from Luxembourg’, in: P. Minderhoud & N. Trimikliniotis (eds), Rethinking 
the free movement of workers: the European challenges ahead, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 
p.56. 
15  Tomkin (2009). 
16  CJEU 20 September 2001, C-184/99 Grzelczyk, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458. 
226 CHAPTER ELEVEN – SANDRA MANTU 
whom their state of residence cannot expel as easily as non-EU migrants. 
Focusing on what is termed 'poverty migration' alone, the underlying message is 
that citizens from poor Member States move to benefit from the generous welfare 
systems of the richer EU States and that this movement is somehow abusive - 
both an abuse of free movement rights and an abuse of the host state's welfare 
system that ultimately endangers the prosperity of the host state and of its 
national citizens. Traces of such thinking are present in the demands put forward 
by David Cameron in relation to Brexit and the amendment of EU free movement 
rules. Similar ideas were underpinning the letter sent by the ministers of interior 
Austria, Netherlands, UK and Germany to the president of the EU Commission in 
2013 prior to the end of transitional arrangements for Bulgaria and Romania, two 
of the EU's poorest Member States, claiming that the end of the transitional 
measures would see an increase in free movement from these two Member States 
that would implode their welfare systems.17 According to the critics of EU 
mobility, the only persons who should be able to move within the EU are 
workers, students if they have enough resources, and persons looking to set up a 
business in a host Member State. Unemployed citizens, those who perform 
atypical work or have patchy employment histories, and citizens who lack 
resources do not seem to have any place in such visions of EU citizenship. Their 
mobility is to be regulated, not least by denying them access to the host state’s 
welfare system.  
 
The data that exists on the mobility of EU citizens shows that the number of 
mobile EU citizens remains low (under 3% of the entire EU population is mobile) 
and, while, most migration takes place from EU10 to EU15, the main reason for 
which people move in the EU is work. The popular theme of migrants moving to 
draw welfare benefits is not supported by empirical data. Since 2013, a host of 
studies were published in an effort to collect data to understand the impact of 
intra-EU mobility on host states. Most of these studies show that the number of 
economically inactive citizens who draw welfare in their host states is small, that 
benefit tourism is not taking place on a large scale and, that generally, EU 
migrants have positive effects upon the economies of their host states.18 A 
comprehensive study commissioned by the European Commission concluded 
that the share of non-active intra-EU migrants is small; such migrants account for 
a very small share of special non-contributory benefits (SNCB) recipients whereas 
the budgetary impact of SNCB claims made by non-active EU citizens is low; 
                                                             
17  Mantu & Minderhoud (2016), p. 10.  
18  ECAS (2014) Fiscal Impact of EU migrants in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and UK, 
Brussels; E. Guild, S. Carrera & K. Eisele (2013), Social Benefits and Migration: A Contested 
Relationship and Policy Challenge in the EU, CEPS: Brussels.  
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moreover, costs associated with the take-up of healthcare by non-active intra-EU 
migrants is equally small.19  
 
Based on existing empirical data, one is tempted to argue that the main 
beneficiaries of EU citizenship are persons who engage in an economic activity. 
Qualitative sociological studies looking at the mobility patterns of Romanian 
citizens in Southern Europe depict these mobile EU citizens as:  
mobile labour force that is willing to change countries in times of 
economic hardship' while their response 'to changes in the labour 
market is further migration and not reliance on the welfare state.20  
The patterns of their migration are described as 'an adaptation to the structural 
opportunities inherent in economic and political systems', while the choice of 
destination relates to the possibility to integrate into the labour market or 
educational system, depending on the reason for migration.21 Studies focusing on 
how EU citizens perceive their mobility, highlight the transformational impact of 
EU citizenship based mobility for Eastern European citizens: 
in the wider EU, human mobility will help cross-border liberalisation, 
because mobility has the ability to liberate localities from central 
authority and encourage new dynamics of connectivity in such a way as 
to confound both core/periphery expectations and conventional models 
of growth and competitiveness.22  
These accounts highlight the positive role that EU citizenship and the model of 
free movement associated with it can have on citizens seen as individuals who 
have dreams and aspirations. This is not to deny that there may be individual 
cases of EU citizens drawing social welfare benefits without entitlement, but the 
overall picture one gets from empirical studies is not one of abuse or fraud. 
 
One can approach the question of who are the addressees of EU citizenship in a 
variety of ways– legally, socially, culturally etc. Although in this section the 
starting point in answering this question was EU law, one can argue that the 
'Other' of EU citizenship is not only the legal ‘Other’ of citizenship status, namely, 
                                                             
19  K. Fóti (2015), Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on social services, Eurofound report 
EF1546; ICF/GHK (2013); A fact finding analysis on the impact on the member States’ social 
security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory 
cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence, Brussels.  
20  R.O. Ciobanu (2015), ‘Multiple Migration Flows of Romanians’, Mobilities 10:3, p.482. 
21   Ciobanu (2015), p.469 and p.471. 
22  S. Marcu (2016), ‘Learning Mobility, Challenging Borders: Cross-border Experiences of Eastern 
European immigrants in Spain’, Mobilities 11:3, p.358. 
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the third country national (TCN) or the asylum seeker. The 'Other' appears as a 
fluid category that covers an undetermined number of possibilities - different 
persons can be classified as the 'Other' at different moments in time, drawing on 
different rationales. It is the ‘poor Other’ that haunts EU citizenship at the 
moment. To paraphrase Bridget Anderson,23 it becomes increasingly clear that 
the EU citizen in law and in data is not the same as the EU citizen of popular and 
political discourse. The gap between these different constructions of EU 
citizenship is difficult to close which, in turn, has consequences for public 
perceptions of EU citizenship. To question who are meant to be the beneficiaries 
of EU citizenship involves delving into a discussion about the normative 
assumptions upon which EU citizenship was built and continues to be developed 
legally through existing legislation, its application by the Member States and its 
interpretation by the courts, including the European Court of Justice. What the 
discussion on EU ‘poverty migration’ shows is that those who are legally included, 
may nevertheless find themselves symbolically excluded. The undoing of EU 
citizenship at a symbolic level and through discursive practices may constitute 
the first steps towards the legal reconfiguration of EU citizenship. Prior to the 
British referendum on leaving the EU, the European Commission negotiated a 
series of amendments to the current rules on EU citizenship and free movement 
as a way of appeasing British concerns on these topics. As Groenedijk discusses in 
his contribution, if adopted, they would have implied a reduction in the rights of 
EU citizens and affected the position of TCNs. Even if such proposals seem 
abandoned as a result of the Brexit vote, the precedent is set.  
11.3. Dangerous ‘Others’: towards a biopolitics of EU citizenship? 
Claims that the mobility of some EU citizens is, in the words of David Cameron 
'too free' and needs to be controlled24, can equally be examined through the lens 
of studies that analyse the links between citizenship, security, and the 
development of forms of governance that are connected to notions of risk, fear, 
anxieties and insecurity in the population.25 These studies explore how discourses 
about migration conflate a plurality of threats (terrorism, crime, disease, 
unemployment) with the image of the migrant. Some of them rely on M. 
                                                             
23  B. Anderson (2012), What does ‘The Migrant’ tell us about the (Good) Citizen?, Working Paper 
94, University of Oxford (WP-12-94). 
24  D. Cameron (2013), ‘Free movement in Europe needs to be less free’, in: Financial Times, 26 
November 2013. 
25  X. Guillaume & J. Huysmans (2013), Citizenship and Security: the Constitution of Political Being, 
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, p.1-18; K. Rygiel (2010), Globalizing Citizenship, UBC Press: 
Vancouver, esp. p.92-113; P. Nyers (2004), ‘Introduction: What's left of citizenship?’, Citizenship 
Studies 8:3, p.203-215; E. Isin (2004), ‘The neurotic citizen’, Citizenship Studies 8:3, p.217-235. 
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Foucault’s notion of ‘biopolitics’ to capture state practices of power that rely on 
processes of organization and categorization aimed at the selection of migrants 
by filtering out the deserving from the undeserving ones. In this section, the use 
of the term is influenced by the work of Imogen Tyler who has shown how British 
citizenship law can be examined as ‘biopolitics’, namely, a field of biopolitical 
techniques and practices (legal, social, moral) through which populations are 
controlled and fashioned.26  
 
We can ask whether in the EU context, we are moving towards a biopolitics of EU 
citizenship that rests on framing certain groups of EU citizens as problematic and 
risky since their exercise of free movement rights threatens ‘our’ security and 
prosperity. In turn, this requires legal practices to control the free movement of 
EU citizens and make it manageable. The framing of EU mobility as ‘poverty 
migration’ can be seen as playing on ‘our’ fears of poverty and of losing the sense 
of security that the welfare state brings along. During the Brexit debate, parts of 
the UK government presented EU mobility as a threat to public services, 
employment, and the general wellbeing and prosperity of the national 
community.27 Likewise, UK political parties argued that EU mobility needs to be 
controlled since most of these EU citizens come here to claim 'our' benefits and 
'our' jobs.28 For the same part, the UK could be substituted for a number of EU 
Member States – Austria, Belgium, Germany or the Netherlands. To the framing 
of EU mobility as ‘poverty migration’, one can add the prevalent negative 
depiction of Roma EU citizens exercising their mobility rights as disruptive and a 
threat to the security of the host state.29 In a number of EU States, the ‘poor Other’ 
is inscribed within a racialized discourse about the mobility of EU citizens from 
the Eastern states. Parker highlights how mobile Roma are designated or 
produced as ‘delinquent citizens’ and subjected to two different logics: 
a political realist logic of security, which seeks to eliminate the 
existential threat to community or citizenry, and a liberal logic, which 
                                                             
26  I. Tyler (2010), ‘Designed to fail: A biopolitics of British citizenship’, Citizenship Studies 14:1, 
p.61-74.  
27  D. Cameron (2015), The Future of Britain’s relationship with the UK, Chatham House 10 
November 2015. 
28  A. Geddes (2014), ‘The EU, UKIP, and the Politics of Immigration in Britain’, The Political 
Quarterly 85:3, p.289-295; D.O. Vicol & W. Allen (2014), Bulgarians and Romanians in the 
British national press: 1 Dec 2012-1 Dec 2013, Migration Observatory report, COMPAS, Oxford: 
University of Oxford.  
29  S. Pallida (2016), Governance of Security and Ignored Insecurities in Contemporary Europe, 
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, p.151-152. 
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seeks to mange risks to the internal market as a space of mobility and 
economic freedoms.30  
The situation of Bulgarian and Romanian mobile Roma and their difficulties in 
exercising EU citizenship rights is illustrative of EU citizenship’s limits, which 
stem from the securitizing and exclusionary potential hidden within EU 
citizenship and free movement law.31  
 
In her work on sovereignty and the building of (physical) walls to keep out 
migrants, Wendy Brown asks what makes efforts of walling parts of a country so 
popular and desired by late modern subjects.32 Whereas in the EU, attempts to 
build walls are primarily targeting non-EU economic migrants disguised as 
‘bogus’ asylum seekers, bearing in mind the conflation that exists in migration 
management discourse between non-desirable TCN economic migrants and EU 
'poverty migration', the answer Brown gives to this question is significant for 
understanding what is at stake in relation to claims that EU mobility needs to be 
controlled. The conflation I refer to is best observed in the UK, where part of the 
public debate on EU migration concerned the need to regain control over EU 
migration in order to bring it more in line with UK's sovereign powers over non-
EU migration. Although during the pre-Brexit debates it was never proposed to 
build a wall to seal off the UK from the rest of the EU, several ideas about limiting 
rights were being deployed as ways of managing EU migration. They went further 
than simply limiting mobility rights for economically inactive EU citizens and 
included proposals to limit access to social rights for EU workers.33 After the vote 
in favour of Brexit and, at the moment inevitable conclusion that the UK will no 
longer be an EU Member State in the foreseeable future, it seems that there will 
be some form of migration control involving EU citizens migrating to the UK - in 
a post-Brexit world, those EU citizens will no longer enter an EU Member State, 
thus their EU free movement rights will no longer be legally relevant in that 
territory. The same will be true for British citizens (no longer EU citizens) when 
entering an EU state. The exact solution that will be reached after Brexit in 
relation to free movement of persons is at the moment of writing unclear (see 
Groenendijk in this volume), but the political signals coming from both London 
and Brussels suggest that future arrangements will depart from the mobility 
framework championed by EU citizenship. We seem to be moving away from the 
notion of a borderless space of freedom in which people move freely and 
                                                             
30  O. Parker (2012), ‘Roma and the Politics of EU citizenship in France: Everyday Security and 
Resistance’, Journal of Common Market Studies 50:3, p.477. 
31  Parker (2012), p.488. 
32  W. Brown (2014), Walled states, Waning Sovereignty, Zone Books: New York.   
33  Cameron (2015).  
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uninhibited by regular border controls. Similarly, the idea of labour circulating 
freely where it is most needed, which was the building block of the free 
movement of persons in the first stages of European integration, also appears to 
have lost its sheen.  
 
While Brexit is not the equivalent of building a wall (along the lines of the U.S.-
Mexico wall, for example), it can be read as a desire to extricate the country from 
the transnational space created by EU citizenship and re-inscribe it within a 
national space, defended by a wall of sovereign power. In her work, Brown notes 
that although (physical) walls are in fact icons of faltering sovereignty and failure, 
they are nevertheless strongly desired and imbued with popular passions.34 Using 
Freud's psychoanalytical theory of defense, she argues that:  
walls facilitate a psychic defense against recognition of a set of internal 
or systemic failures that are relocated to the outside and against 
recognition of a set of unacceptable facts of dependency, unprotected 
vulnerability, or even responsibility for colonial violence in the context 
of declining sovereign power.35 
While it is illusionary to believe that walls can stem off transnational migration 
flows, from the perspective of a modern subject (a citizen) who faces a loss of 
horizons and identity as well as being faced with the decline of state sovereignty, 
walls offer psychic reassurances. Brown's 'diagnosis' of the underlying causes for 
desiring walls, containment and security in the familiar space of the nation state 
is relevant for discussions on EU citizenship and its capacity to deliver a unifying 
supranational project of peace and economic prosperity that places the (EU) 
citizen at the centre of its design. As such, '... declining protective capacities of the 
state, diluted nationhood, and the increasing vulnerability of subjects everywhere to 
global economic vicissitudes and transnational violence'36 fuel the search for 
protection mechanisms which may take the form of a physical wall or, as in the 
context of increasing migration, more restrictive migration policies and practices. 
It does not seem accidental that in the EU, the contestation of EU citizens' 
mobility started to build momentum as the effects of the global economic crisis 
were starting to be felt in various EU countries, and as EU governments started to 
adopt restrictive welfare policies designed to implement austerity measures. It is 
at this moment of (economic) crisis that national solidarity towards mobile EU 
citizens starts to show its cracks, as welfare rights are reinforced as the hallmark 
of national belonging and worthiness. Thus, it becomes possible not only to 
                                                             
34  Brown (2014), p. 114. 
35  Brown (2014), p. 125. 
36  Brown (2014), p. 114. 
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politically rally voters around cries for regaining sovereignty and limiting EU 
migration, but also to legitimately shift the boundaries of social solidarity to 
which mobile EU citizens are entitled to in their host states.37  
 
According to T.H. Marshall's definition of citizenship, social rights are the 
hallmark of being a full member of a community.38 In the context of EU 
citizenship, this reading of citizenship has always been problematic for labelling 
EU citizenship as real ‘citizenship’ (see Guild this volume) since economically 
inactive citizens enjoy a much more restricted notion of social solidarity than 
economically active citizens. Directive 2004/38 and the Court’s case law that 
advanced the social rights of economically inactive EU citizens were seen as part 
of EU citizenship’s development towards citizenship in the Marshallian under-
standing of this term. The Directive introduced the legal status of permanent 
residence, which effectively means that a EU citizen who is a permanent resident 
in a host EU state enjoys in that state equal treatment with nationals in respect of 
social rights, without having to fulfil other conditions. The Court’s case law that 
proclaimed that EU citizens may expect a certain amount of financial solidarity 
from their host state, if they find themselves in difficulties finds expression in the 
preamble of the Directive 2004/38 and Article 14 that states that expulsion should 
not be the automatic consequences of having access to social rights in the host 
state as far as economically inactive citizens are concerned. Although poor 
citizens are not necessarily economically inactive from the perspective of EU law, 
the emblematic figure of the intersection between poverty and economic 
inactivity is Ms Dano39, a Romanian Roma single mother who lived with her two 
children in Germany in the apartment of her sister. In the judgment of the Court 
of Justice, Ms Dano is described as not working, nor looking for a job and, almost 
illiterate. Ms Dano was already receiving allowances for her two children, when 
she asked for a social benefit to supplement her resources. The German 
authorities refused her the benefit arguing that Ms Dano had moved to Germany 
with the sole aim of claiming benefits, which excluded her from entitlement to 
receive social assistance benefits. Based on the applicable national law, it can be 
argued that social solidarity in the form of social assistance benefits was not 
available to EU citizens who, in the eyes of the law, moved to Germany in order 
to seek benefits, but only to those who moved to perform activities as workers or 
                                                             
37   C. O’Brien (2015), ‘The pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope: the profound effects of the 
UK’s legal reform programme targeting EU migrants’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
37:1, p.116-136. 
38  T.H. Marshall (1950), Citizenship and social class and other essays, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
39  CJEU 11 November 2014, C-333/13, Dano, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358. 
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self-employed EU citizens or if economically inactive, had enough resources not 
to need benefits. As Minderhoud has pointed out, applicants like Ms Dano find 
themselves in a 'catch-22' situation: they are entitled to social solidarity as 
economically inactive EU citizen only when they have enough resources not to 
need it.40 The Court decided that since Ms Dano did not fulfil the conditions of 
self-sufficiency set out in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38, her residence was not 
in line with EU law and thus not entitled to equal treatment on the basis of EU 
law.  
 
It is nevertheless important to highlight that, at both discursive and legal levels, 
the move is not towards a complete denial of the benefits of EU free movement. 
Similar to contemporary migration management regimes developed by liberal 
economies, the aim is to manage migration and filter out the legitimate from the 
illegitimate,41 and intervene where the market logic breaks down and leads to 
unemployment, atypical work, zero hours contracts and precarity.42 Law is called 
to uphold the narrative of freedom associated with EU citizenship but also to 
intervene when the market disrupts that narrative by reinforcing the different 
treatment awarded by Directive 2004/38 to those who fail to engage with the 
market via performance of economic activities or via self-sufficiency and self-
reliance. It is at this juncture that the case law of the European Court of Justice 
concerning mobile EU citizens and their claims to social solidarity is worth 
bringing into the discussion. Cases such as Brey, Dano, Alimanovic, Garcia Nieto 
or Commission v. UK43 put forward a specific reading of free movement rights that 
affects the link between EU citizenship and non-discrimination in the social field 
- that is, the tenet upon which EU citizenship has developed as a status that 
transcends the free movement of workers and self-employed persons. The above 
mentioned cases question the extent to which an EU citizen who is not a worker 
or no longer a worker can in cases where she faces financial difficulties due to 
                                                             
40  P. Minderhoud (2016), ‘Sufficient resources and residence rights under Directive 2004/38’, in: 
H. Verschueren (ed), Where do I belong? EU law and adjudication on the link between indivi-
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41  Bigo, D.  (2011), ‘Freedom and speed in enlarged borderzones’, in: V. Squire (ed), The contested 
politics of mobility. Borderzones and irregularity, Routledge, p. 46. 
42  Mezzadra, S. (2011), ‘The gaze of autonomy - Capitalism, migration and social struggles’, in: V. 
Squire (ed), The contested politics of mobility. Borderzones and irregularity, Routledge, p. 130; 
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Dano, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358; CJEU 15 September 2015, C-67/14 Alimanovic, ECLI:EU:C:2015:597; 
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unemployment or lack of sufficient resources ask her host Member State for 
social benefits of a financial nature to help meet the costs of daily life. The Court 
has gradually and increasingly started to answer 'no' to such questions by relying 
on the argument that Member States have a right to refuse social benefits to 
mobile EU citizens who cannot or no longer fulfil the requirements of self-
sufficiency. This right to refuse social benefits stems from the fact that self-
sufficiency is a prerequisite for exercising free movement rights for longer than 3 
months, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of Directive 2004/38. The 
trend has been not only towards a more restrictive view of social solidarity and 
who is entitled to share in a nation's welfare, but also towards dismantling one of 
the legal mechanisms through which social solidarity has been pursued in the 
Court's previous case law, namely, the principle of proportionality. In the general 
economy of EU law and EU free movement of persons, state interferences with an 
EU citizen's right to move and reside freely can be justified if they are 
proportional, an exercise which relies on the individual assessment of each case 
based on its merits. In the more specific field of equality and social rights, 
Directive 2004/38 introduces the idea that, although prior to the acquisition of 
the right to permanent residence, a host EU state may refuse economically 
inactive citizens and jobseekers social assistance benefits (which are needs based 
and funded through general taxation as opposed to personal contribution into 
the welfare system), the state should nevertheless undertake an individual 
examination of the case and perform a proportionality assessment. At the same 
time, in line with neoliberal trends concerning the contraction of the welfare 
state, the Court of Justice has increasingly relabelled benefits social assistance, as 
opposed to social security44, thus hollowing out the content of the welfare state.  
 
The ‘poor Other’ of EU citizenship is the object of biopolitics because of its 
dangerousness for the nation as the species-body45 that needs to be secured 
through governmental practices that emphasize the need to control mobility by 
sorting out deserving EU citizens from undeserving ones. Law plays an important 
role in this process as the mechanism through which legitimate claims of 
mobility are recognized. The case law of the Court of Justice shows a clear move 
towards giving value as a source of rights, protection, and equal treatment, only 
to residence that fulfils the conditions of Directive 2004/38. Deservingness is 
increasingly viewed through the lens of  financial self-sufficiency and coupled 
with a restrictive interpretation of welfare rights. More radical readings of 
Marshalls’ citizenship theory suggest that the extension of welfare rights was 
meant to incorporate the working poor into the community and pacify them, 
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45  Isin, E. (2004), ‘The neurotic citizen’, Citizenship Studies 8:3, p.230.  
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while equally ensuring the smooth functioning of the capitalist market.46 The 
continued saliency of questions about social inclusion and exclusion in the 
context of EU citizenship case law points towards the failure of EU citizenship to 
act as an equalizer of the different social and economic conditions of EU citizens. 
The current legal tools contained by the citizenship and free movement 
provisions in the Treaty and the Citizens Directive do not seem sufficient to 
address how the transformation of welfare rights from citizenship rights as in the 
Marshallian definition of citizenship into conditional rights under neoliberalism 
and the rise of the precariat is played out at the EU level and, more specifically, in 
the context of EU citizenship.  
 
The figure of the poor and dangerous ‘Other’ as an ‘internal Other’47 and as an 
object of biopolitics confronts us with a vision of EU citizenship that is far 
removed from the initial optimism associated with it but which, nevertheless, 
reflects the mobility experiences of some EU citizens. One can interpret this 
development as connected with the fact that after more than 20 years, the legal 
implications of EU citizenship finally start to bite, as the Member States need to 
implement them. The economic crisis has not helped this process as it 
exacerbated a number of contradictions that exist within national citizenship 
itself, especially in relation to social rights.48 And yet, the ‘poverty migration’ 
debate highlights the tension that is in-built in EU citizenship’s reach and its 
failure to move entirely away from has been labelled the ‘market’ model of 
citizenship.49 While the economic crisis will eventually ease out and the Member 
States will get better at implementing the legal rights of EU citizens, the latter 
tension is not that easily resolved without sustained political and legal 
commitment to a supranational model of membership.  
11.4. EU citizenship and difference 
The previous two sub-sections have discussed how the ‘poor Other’ is the imagine 
that haunts political discourses and legal practices of EU citizenship, to an extent 
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where it becomes plausible to interrogate discourses such as ‘poverty migration’ 
through the lens of biopolitics or, at the very least, a politics of fear and 
insecurity. In this final part, I want to propose a different take on the Court's case 
law concerning mobile EU citizens by having a closer look at who claims EU 
citizenship rights. To put it differently, who is behind the legal fiction of the EU 
citizen? There are certain dangers in trying to understand the social aspects of EU 
citizenship by focusing on rights' claiming and jurisprudence alone. The Court’s 
case law can offer a limited understanding of EU citizenship: it tells us where 
tensions and difficulties exist in relation to claiming EU citizenship rights, but 
fails to say anything about the mobility of EU citizens who do not encounter 
obstacles when moving or about the mobility of those citizens who lack resources 
to make legal claims. Equally, jurisprudence has little to say in terms of why 
people move or fail to do so.  
 
With this caveat in mind, I still think it is important to ask who makes legal 
claims in their capacity as mobile EU citizens and what this means for our 
understanding of EU citizenship’s potential. A bird’s eye view of the Court’s 
recent case law suggests that economically inactive citizens, unemployed or job-
seeking EU citizens encounter problems when seeking equal treatment with 
nationals of their host states in relation to welfare rights (see also Guild, this 
volume Chapter 10). Mobile citizens with a criminal past are also targeted by host 
Member States as problematic migrants who should be expelled from state 
territory and ideally prevented from returning.50 Mobile Roma citizens, most of 
who are from Eastern Europe, are one group of EU citizens who encounter a 
whole range of difficulties when attempting to exercise their rights as EU 
citizens,51 but their struggles are not well reflected by EU citizenship case law. It 
can be argued that some of the persons who were supposed to find a legal home 
in EU citizenship continue to have difficulties in asserting their rights as EU 
citizens. In the introduction I suggested that EU citizenship could be approached 
as a ‘momentum concept’ that needs to be constantly reworked to achieve its 
inclusionary potential. To understand why some citizens are left out and have 
difficulties in exercising their EU citizenship rights, it may be useful to look 
beyond economic activity as the only axis of differentiation in the economy of EU 
citizenship provisions. This section draws on feminist concerns with 
embodiment and positionality to raise a series of questions about the manner in 
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which EU citizenship incorporates difference in its legal provisions dealing with 
free movement rights.  
 
Lister (2007) has examined the important role played by feminist scholars in 
questioning the reach of citizenship’s claims of universalism in the face of its 
failure to include marginalized groups in its theory and practice.52 Much of this 
work is doubled by feminist critiques of liberal legalism and law’s use of neutral 
and genderless notions of personhood that are nevertheless built upon a male 
template, thus making it difficult for women to claim legal subjectivity and 
recognition. Hunter examines how feminist scholars have consistently 
questioned the tenet of liberal legalism that views the legal person as ‘rational, 
autonomous, self-contained, self-possessed, self-sufficient and formally equal before 
the law’.53 The link with citizenship comes from the fact that modern citizens are 
understood as modern legal subjects, thus the superimposition of a gendered 
template of legal subjectivity inevitably leads to gendered citizenship. It is worth 
exploring the implications of this process for EU citizenship, since as a legal 
status it does not abandon the language of national citizenship and legal 
personhood with its claims of universality and neutrality. According to Rygiel 
feminist scholarship underlines the relational aspect of mobility by highlighting 
how one’s access and ability to move relate to one’s positionality or the body one 
is in.54 The recognition of the importance of the biological body in the economy 
of mobility makes ‘embodied mobility’ the frame through which mobility and its 
politics are investigated. Bodies are not neutral, they are gendered and produced 
through relations and hierarchies of power that rest on gender, race, class, 
sexuality etc.55 The lesson to be taken from feminist critiques of citizenship is the 
need to think of how bodies are differentially included into the body politic, 
despite being legally included as citizens. Beyond the fiction of the legal person 
enjoying the legal status of EU citizenship there is a physical body whose 
characteristics influence one's experiences of (EU) citizenship, the possibility of 
moving and the manner in which movement is legally captured. To put this into a 
personal perspective, although I share the same nationality as the applicant in 
the Dano case my experience of free movement as an EU worker citizen is miles 
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apart from hers. This remains true even if, in the legal framework of EU law, it is 
traditionally our nationality that singles us out for different treatment as mobile 
EU citizens in a host state. EU citizenship does not depart from the liberal 
understanding of citizenship that exists at the national level according to which 
all citizens are equal before the law as ideal-type legal subjects. Since in an EU 
context, EU citizens have different nationalities this is dealt with by making the 
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality an instrument to 
neutralize difference as well as the building block of the internal market. 
 
Once we attempt to go beyond the legal categories used by the Citizens' Directive 
to capture the mobility of EU citizens, it becomes clear that terms such as 
'worker', 'economically inactive' or 'jobseeker' fail to reveal the personal stories 
and characteristics of the bodies that exercise mobility. From the vantage point 
of embodied practices of mobility, some of the Court's case law can be described 
as comprising women, single mothers, sometimes with a foreign spouse with an 
immigration problem,56 pensioners with low incomes,57 poor people,58 low-skilled 
workers,59 people with a criminal background,60 or Roma making claims based on 
their EU citizenship status.61 This alternative view posits gender, class, social 
origin, ethnicity, age etc as relevant factors for understanding EU citizenship and 
its differentiated meaning. Despite EU citizenship‘s claim to universality that 
posits that every EU citizen has a right to move, it is possible to speak of a logic of 
exclusion that maps onto gender, age, class etc. In turn, this raises questions as to 
how categories of citizens who are marginalized at the national level can assert 
supranational rights at the EU level and to what extent EU citizenship is a 
mechanism through which agency can be exercised. EU citizenship can be 
approached as a strategy to negotiate access to rights at various levels. This is 
shown by the line of case law opened by Zambrano that brought within the scope 
of EU law citizens who have never moved and who were traditionally viewed as 
outside the reach of EU citizenship rights. This new direction is encouraging 
when thinking of EU citizenship as a work in progress since it highlights its 
transformative potential. Yet, this line of case law is difficult to square with that 
on social rights as EU citizenship rights which at the moment is moving into a 
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more restrictive direction.62 We need critical engagement with the tensions that 
EU citizenship has to address in order to become a transformative status for all 
EU citizens and achieve its inclusionary potential. Economic activity or lack 
thereof is not the only factor that can lead to a different experience of EU 
citizenship and of the right to move. Differences based on age, gender, ethnicity, 
social class are equally important in structuring the mobility of EU citizens and 
they deserve a more prominent place in analyses of EU citizenship.  
11.5. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has tried to sketch some alternative ways of thinking about EU 
citizenship, which incorporate socio-political aspects of EU mobility and 
citizenship. The aim is to broaden the analysis of EU citizenship and the frames 
of reference beyond the legal rules contained in the Treaty, secondary legislation, 
and their interpretation by the EU Court of Justice. If EU citizenship is indeed to 
become a fundamental status for EU citizens, a number of contradictions that are 
inbuilt in the notion of citizenship itself need to be articulated and confronted at 
the EU level. The area of social rights is one where the inclusionary-exclusionary 
nexus of citizenship has been most visible, as claims about ‘poverty migration’ 
show very well. Public and political debates concerning EU citizens and their 
mobility have shown that there is a danger that some EU citizens will be labelled 
‘poor’ and ‘dangerous’ Others and left outside the scope of EU citizenship. The 
capacity of EU citizenship law to deal with differences based on other categories 
besides nationality is an equally problematic aspect of how law frames the 
mobility of EU citizens. The tensions and difficulties discussed in this chapter are 
intended as a critique of EU citizenship and as a reminder that the legal 
expression of this status and of the rights associated with it has exclusionary 
consequences that are difficult to square with the proclaimed universality and 
neutrality of EU citizenship. EU citizens use their status and make claims in their 
capacity as EU citizens, to which national and EU authorities must respond. 
These encounters are constitutive of the process through which EU citizenship 
gains weight and materiality, and hopefully reaches its inclusionary potential. 
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